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In Defense of Miracles

and are to be expected given a widely held view of divine agency in the
miraculous. Moreover, Van Till's characterization of narrow naturalism
either is question-begging or represents a misunderstanding of divine
action in the areas of investigation listed throughout this chapter (for
example, the origin of first life). It is question-begging because advocates
of theistic science do not view the origin of life, various kinds of life and
so forth as involving solely natural capacities and physical interactions,
and they see no sufficient evidence to change their minds. Alternatively,
it is a misunderstanding because Van Till incorrectly locates a main
intellectual drive toward theistic science in the conflation between two
sorts of naturalism and not, as we have seen, where it should be. It is up
to him to show clear examples of how this confusion on the part of
advocates of theistic science figures essentially into their position.
In this chapter I have not had the space to defend libertarian agency
for human or divine (primary causal) action, though I obviously think
such a defense is possible. Instead I have tried to show that the claim that"
miracles are in principle outside the bounds of science is one that is
embedded in an attitude that includes a complementarian, methodological naturalist view of science and reality, along with a compatibilist view
of human and divine action in the natural world (outside salvation
history). This, in turn, has led many to reject the presence of gaps
requiring theistic explanation because, among other things, the backdrop just mentioned denies that such gaps exist. By contrast, while I
would not limit the use of theistic science to the employment of direct,
primary causal acts of God, it seems to me thatifsuch acts have occurred
in certain cases, and if libertarian agency is a good model for characterizing such acts, then there will, in fact, be gaps in the causal fabric that
are irreducibly nonnatural and must be recognized as such within
scientific practice. Whether or not miracles are outside the bounds of
science, then, turns in part on our model of divine agency, which in turn
can be understood on the basis of an analogy with human action.
Complementarians may reject libertarian agency, but even if they do it
should be clear why some of us who accept the libertarian model believe
that the recognition of miracles can be part of scientific practice.

NINE
GOD'S
EXISTENCE
W. DAVID BECK

T HE PROBLEM OF MIRACLES IS CLOSELY ASSOCIATED WITH THE QUEStion of God's existence. Miracles have even been used to argue for the
existence of God. As Douglas Geivett explains in chapter eleven, one
type of argument for miracles depends in part on first developing a
successful argument for God's existence. This chapter presents an approach to arguing for the existence of God in a way that sets the stage
for arguing that miracles are possible, perhaps even probable. What is
needed is an argument powerful enough not only to justify beliefin the
existence of God but also to establish at least three things about the
nature of God:
1. God is a being powerful enough to produce events in space/time.
2. God is an intelligence with a capacity to frame the convergence of
events in space/time.
3. God is a personality with the moral concern to act in history.
As it happens, these three propositions are the conclusions of three
traditional arguments, often used independently to justify belief in the
reality of God. The cosmological argument concludes that there is a
being that is the cause of all existence in space/time, the teleological (or
design) argument that there is an intelligent designer of the universe,
and the moral argument that objective moral judgments are supported
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by the will of a transcendent and authoritative moral personality. Since
these three arguments differ with respect to the precise formulation of
the conclusion reached, they can in combination exhibit the rationality
of believing in the existence of a moral personality with sufficient power,
intelligence and motive to act miraculously within the world, which owes
its existence to that same personality.
Often these arguments are construed along lines that fit the pattern
ofinference to the best explanation:
1. Identify some prominent feature of reality that is puzzling and
requires explanation.
2. Illustrate the inadequacy of available naturalistic explanations for
this feature.
3. Infer the existence and activity of a supernatural being as the best
explanation.
Arguments that follow this pattern do not "prove" the existence of God
in the sense that the conclusion follows necessarily from obviously true
premises. But nothing that ambitious is really needed. If a theistic
hypothesis is the best explanation for a sufficiently wide range of puzzling
l
phenomena, then it will be most reasonable to accept that hypothesis.
The Cosmological Argument
There is no single argument that might be designated the cosmological
argument. Rather, there are numerous categories of cosmological arguments, with individual versions of each. 2 Many cosmological arguments
have in common, however, the inference to an ultimate cause from the
contingency or dependency of things. I will present one version of the
argument and then respond to common objections. I conclude that this
type of argument is able to withstand attacks and that we are entitled to
hold that there is a Being with the capacity to cause events in space/time,
thus providing the first component of a theistic basis for affirming the
reality of miracles.
Premise 1: Every physical object we observe to exist is contingent. This
3
argument begins with a simple observation concerning the things we
see and know about in the physical world around us. It is not a statement
about everything in the universe, let alone every possible entity, but only
about those things we actually observe (or sense perceive either directly
or indirectly). The key element in this first premise is the notion of
"contingency." Just what is that? Possibly Paul implies a form of tllis
argument in Romans 1: 19-20: "What may be known about God is plain
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to them, because God has made it plain to them. For since the creation
of the world God's invisible qualities-his eternal power and divine
nature-have been clearly seen, being understood from what has been
made, so that men are without excuse" (NIV). In this passage the phrase
"since the creation" has not only a temporal but a causative sense that
reinforces the "what has been made" clause. The point here is that
everyone can see that certain things owe their existence to other things.
Nothing we know of exists without being caused by something else in
the universe; and these causes are themselves effects of other causes.
Patterson Brown has described this characteristic of some causal
relations as transitivity/ that is, A is caused by B, but only as B is caused
by C. Electrons and galaxies only pass on or transfer whatever they have
received as effects of other causes. Every physical object we know of
possesses this sort of contingency: it exists and functions only as it is
caused by other objects in tlle chain and, if Einstein is right, by every
other factor in the whole cosmic network of these causal chains.
Premise 2: The sequence of causally related contingent objects cannot be
infinite. The first premise describes the universe as a system or network
of causal chains. The point of the second premise is to indicate that this
system, regardless of how complex and interconnected, and regardless
of how extensive it may be, is nevertheless finite. In support of this
conclusion, most cosmological arguments involve an appeal to analogies.
For example, Thomas Aquinas uses the picture of a hand moving a stick
moving a ball. But perhaps most frequently used and discussed is the
train analogy.
Imagine that you are introducing some alien from Alpha Centauri to
the marvels of planet Earth. In a forest clearing in front ofyou is a boxcar
moving on the tracks. Baffled, your alien buddy asks you why it is
moving. You reply that it is pulled by a boxcar in front of it but hidden
by the trees. "And how does that boxcar move?" the alien asks. "It is
pulled by another boxcar," you say. And so on.
This story invites us to imagine analogies for the various naturalistic
scenarios that describe how it is that things exist in the real world. "The
cosmos is a great circle of being," proposes the naturalist. But, returning
to our story, stringing boxcars all the way around the earth until the last
one hooks up to the first cannot explain the motion of the first boxcar.
The naturalist persists: "The cosmos is an intricately evolved ecosystem
in which everything is related causally to everything else." So boxcars
clutter the world in an unimaginably complex system of railroading

152

In Defense of Miracles

enterprise such that in some way every other boxcar is pulling the first
one. We still have no accounting, however, for the motion of that first
one.
It is tempting to settle the problem of ultimate causal explanation by
noting that each boxcar is being pulled by the one in front of it. But this
is where transitivity becomes crucial. It may well be true that boxcar A
is pulled by boxcar B. But B can pull A only because B is being pulled
by C. The pulling action ofB is transitive. It occurs only because B is, in
turn, pulled by C. And so it is also true that A is being pulled by C. And
C, and therefore A, is pulled by D, and so on.
The naturalist may imagine yet another alternative. Suppose there are
infinitely many boxcars. Or, speaking of the universe, suppose the
naturalist says, "The causal explanation of objects in the universe is
absbrbed in infinite complexity." But now something important becomes obvious. An infinity of boxcars will still leave unsolved the
problem of explaining why the first boxcar is moving and hence why any
are. The problem is not with the arrangement of boxcars, nor is it a matter
of the number of boxcars. Theproblem is that no boxcar in the chain
has the capacity to generate or initiate its own motion. It can pass on the
pulling, but it does not initiate it.
Likewise, the problem with everything we know of in the universe is
its contingency. The supposition that the causal nexus is constituted by
infinitely many contingent objects fails to be an ultimate explanation for
the existence of any individual object in the nexus. There has been no
full accounting for the existence of even the first item of the sequence
currently under observation. As Thomas Aquinas summarizes: "But ifin
efficient causes it is possible to go on to infinity, there will be no first efficient
cause, neither will there be an effect nor any intermediate efficient causes;
all of which is plainly false.,,5

Conclusion: There must be a first cause ofthe system ofcontingent objects
in causal sequence. Where does this argument lead? The appropriate
conclusion may be inferred without effort. If the causal sequence is finite,
as it must be, then there is a first cause. If there are finitely many boxcars
in motion, then there is a first (or last depending on which way you look
at it). Perhaps it is not obvious that the first cause must be God. The
apostle Paul, however, observes that we know both the "eternal power"
and the "divine nature" of God. Thomas Aquinas simply concludes that
"it is necessary to admit a first efficient cause to which everyone gives
the name of God.,,6 But can we conclude that the first cause is God?
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The concept of "first cause" has two implications. To say that it is the

first cause is to say that it neither requires nor has a cause itself. First is
first! Thus it is fundamentally different from every other cause inside the
system: it is not contingent. It depends on, is limited by or exists because
of absolutely nothing else. This first cause does not merely pass on
causality in a transitive relation; rather, it literally initiates the causality.
The apostle's phrase "divine nature" is literally "God-ness," which
conveys the idea of nondependence.
To say of the conclusion that it is the first cause is to define its relation
to everything else in the sequence, namely, that it is their cause. It is the
cause of all things in the sequence in that it initiates all of the causal
activity in the sequence, without forbidding that each cause is, in fact,
the cause of the next one in the sequence. The only explanation for the
imagined moving line of boxcars is that somewhere there is a locomotive
powerful enough to pull the whole train, an engine that does not itself
need to be pulled. This seems to be included in Paul's notion of eternal
(all-there-ever-is) power. And so the concept of a first cause is richer than
it might at first appear. It is the actual cause of the existence ofeverything
in the universe, and it itself exists without any cause or dependency
whatsoever. This we may indeed call "God."
Objections Considered
We can clarify the conclusion just reached by dealing with some major
objections to this argument. One of the most frequent is that the
conclusion of the argument still does not look much like God. Certainly
it is not the triune God of the Bible, who seeks our relationship and
worship. Walter Kaufmann, for example, concludes his discussion of
Thomas Aquinas's arguments by remarking, "Clearly, the God of Aquinas' theology is not the God ofJob, Moses, or Jesus.,,7 How are we to.
derive God's personhood, love, holiness, uniqueness or otherness from
the meager conclusion of the above argument? "God" appears in the
cosmological argument merely as a nondescript causal power behind the
universe.
Arguably, the cosmological argument does not yield a full concept of
God. But the argument is sufficient to show that the naturalist judgment
that the physical universe is all there is is clearlywrong. 8 There is at least
one thing in the causal network that is not another contingent object
and on which everything else depends. We should also note that the
cosmological argument has sometimes been extended by drawing out
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the implications of the idea of an uncaused cause.9 I have not attempted
this here since my project is to elucidate a concept of God sufficient for
establishing the possibility, perhaps even the probability, of miracles. This
project begins with a cosmological argument that shows that there is a
nonnatural agency capable of producing events in space/time.
Another criticism simply rejects all arguments against an infinite
sequence by noting that an infinite mathematical series is logically
possible. "One wonders why, if there can be infinite sequences in
mathematics, there could not be one in causality," says Michael Martin. lo
But Martin's inference is unfounded. First, supposing the actual existence of infinitely many numbers does not affect the above argument for
a necessarily finite causal nexus, for, presumably, the relation between
elements in the number series is not causal. Furthermore, we should not
confuse logical possibilities with actual realities. While it is perhaps
conceivable that there are infinitely many causes in the chain of objects
constituting the physical universe, the mere conceivability of this does
nothing to recommend it to us for belief. Not everything that can be
conceived should be believed, otherwise one would be obliged to believe
two contradictory propositions just so long as both are conceivable.
When faced with the choice of believing one or another of two contradictory propositions, both of which are conceivable, one should believe
the proposition with the greater explanatory power.
Paul Edwards, another atheist, argues that what we encounter in the
real world are complete causes such that there is no reason for thinking
that the system of causes must be finite. That is, knowing that A is caused
by B is enough to explain A, and we are not required to ask questions
about C. The real world is more like a string oflocomotives, he thinks.ll
Here there is a failure to appreciate the real nature of contingency and
how this relates to causality in the actual world. No physical object we
know ofis like a locomotive; that is, nothing explains its own existence.
This is the point of calling each individual physical object we observe
"contingent." Nothing fully explains the existence of anything else by
itself Our universe is less like a sequence oflocomotives than a sequence
ofboxcars.u
In his highly acclaimed book A Brief History of Time) Stephen W.
Hawking suggests that space/time may be closed, "self-contained,
having no boundary or edge," and that this would eliminate any need
for a creatorP But this is just to assert that a circle of boxcars could
explain the motion of anyone of them. Robin Le Poidevin points out
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that whether linear or circular, the system cannot account for itself. 14 The
problem, again, is the contingency of every object in the system, not the
specific arrangement of the contingent causes.
Other criticisms are directed at the principle of causality, a principle
common to all cosmological arguments. The complaint is that the
argument either explicitly or tacitly assumes the principle that existence
needs an explanation. But the force of the term needs has been variously
understood. In some forms of the cosmological argument (Leibniz's is
the famous example), the principle is construed as logically necessary.
But it has often been argued that no such principle can or could be
established as a point oflogic. l5 The principle is at the very least, however,
an empirical, scientific generalization about the facts of the physical
world, a principle whose unexceptionable character we rely on in the
practice of science. While the success of the principle in scientific practice
provides a weaker basis for accepting the principle than would be the
case if it was an a priori deliverance of reason, this principle does
effectively govern rational decision-making. It would be a form of special
pleading, then, to prohibit appeal to the principle of causality in our
cosmological argument for the existence of God.
There are other lesser objections to this argument that do not, as far
as I can tell, endanger it. Here, then, is a strong argument for the
conclusion that there is a first cause of objects constitutive of the physical
universe. This is the first point needed in affirming the action of God in
history by means of a miracle.

The Teleological Argument
This argument is probably the oldest, simplest, shortest and easiest to
understand of all the theistic arguments. It is based on the common
perception that the universe, taken either as a whole or as some part of
it, has features that are too complex to have occurred by chance. They
must, therefore, have an intelligent source. Richard Swinburne points
out that there is no question about the validity of the logic of this
argument. l6 It is based on an analogy between the natural universe and
machines. The most famous example of this type of analogy comes from
William Paley's classic work Natural TheologyP Suppose, walking along,
we discover a shiny object on the ground. We observe first the precise
and regular motion of the hands and then discover inside the object an
incredible array of gears, springs and levers, all working together to tell
the exact time of day.
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What should we conclude? Should we be amazed at what the elements
can produce by chance? Surely not. We infer that a device with such
intricate design, which carries out such precise means to an end, cannot
simply have occurred without the aid of a designer. Paley draws a parallel
between the watch example and the universe: "Every indication of
contrivance, every manifestation of design which existed in the watch,
exists in the works of nature, with the difference on the side of nature
being greater and more, and that in a degree which exceeds all computation.,,18 The teleological or design argument notes the intelligent
design of tools and machines evident in their purposiveness and functionality and infers a similar intelligent design to explain similarity of
purposiveness and functioning in the natural order.
Premise 1: The universe has features that exhibit functional and pur-·
posive structure. It is a simple observation that the natural universe
includes elements that in their complex structure are means to an end.
These complexities often lend themselves very nicely to a quantitative
approach. In particular, the probability of these complexities may be
measured statistically, and this avoids the pitfall of circularity.
The formulation of the design argument sketched here avoids certain
problems associated with arguments about the universe as a whole. There
are two problems here, both pointed out long ago by David Hume,l9
and both of which, though they can be overcome, only invite unnecessary difficulty. One problem is that we know too little about the universe
as a whole to make any comparisons between it and machines. Moreover,
since we know of only one universe, our basis for comparison is too small.
The other problem is that the universe is full of examples of evil, chaos,
disorder and apparently useless things (like the panda's tl1Umb) that
would also have to be explained as part of a universal analogy. We will
return to these concerns shortly.
Premise 2: Features of the universe exhibiting functional and purposive
structure cannot be explained by chance. Since we can calculate the
probability of an event's occurrence, we can attach specific values to
natural phenomena to indicate whether they might occur as a result of
the normal randomness permitted by the laws of physics, that is, by
chance. A few examples of the kinds of probabilities involved are needed
here to indicate just how strong this argument is.
Fine-tuning. A great deal has been learned in recent years about the
adaptedness of the universe to human life. Despite tlle innumerable
possibilities of getting it wrong and the incalculable complexities of

-

157

systems needed to make human life work, the cosmos got everything
right. Hugh Ross, in a recent collection of evidence relevant to the
teleological argument, lists fifty-seven examples of such "fine-tuning,"
each of which by themselves would be enough to suggest intelligent
design. The probability of their accidentally occurring together is infinitesimally small. Here are a few examples of conditions that had to be met
in order for life to arise on our planet.20
1. Mass density of the universe
If larger: too much deuterium from big bang, hence stars burn
too rapidly
If smaller: insufficient helium from big bang, hence too few heavy
elements forming
2. Polarity of the water molecule
If greater: heat of fusion and vaporization would be too great for
life to exist
If smaller: heat of fusion and vaporization would be too small for
life's existence; liquid water would become too inferior a solvent
for life chemistry to proceed; ice would not float, leading to a
runaway freeze-up
3. Oxygen quantity in atmosphere
If greater: plants and hydrocarbons would burn up too easily
Ifless: advanced animals would have too little to breathe
We must stress that these precise conditions themselves do not exist in
isolation. They are all related to one another and dependent on the laws
ofphysics in general .. Not only did the universe get everything right when
the slightest deviation at innumerable points would have eliminated the
possibility of life, but the universe appears to have been preadapted for
life.
DNA. The investigation of DNA is another rich source of evidence
of design. Physicists Fred Hoyle and Chandra Wickramasinghe, commenting on just one phase of the development of DNA, concluded in
1981:
The trouble is that there are about two thousand enzymes, and the
chance of obtaining them all in a random trial is only one part in
(10 20 )2000 = 1040,000, an outrageously small probability that could not
be faced even if the whole universe consisted of organic soup. If one
is not prejudiced . . . that life originated on the Earth, this simple
calculation wipes the idea entirely out of court. 21
The crucial thing about DNA is that it has to exist before there are
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intelligent creatures, and yet it has the character of encoded information
which can only be produced by an intelligence.22 Thus, it too demands
that there be an intelligence external to any developing system.

Conclusion: There is an intelligent source ofthe functional and purposive
structures in the universe. Let us be clear about the conclusion. Again, it
must be obvious that our conclusion falls short of the God of the Bible.
Many of David Hume's criticisms of the design argument make this very
point. The argument does not entail that there is only one God, let alone
that God is unqualifiedly good or unlimited. It is best to acknowledge
these limitations of the argument and assimilate the argument into a total
cumulative case for the existence of God. All that really follows from the
design argument sketched here is that certain features of the universe
could not have been produced by chance processes internal to the
universe and that the actual source must have an intelligence beyond
anything we can imitate or even imagine. That is all that we need in order
to satisfY the second point required as a rational basis for affirming the
reality of miracles. And the argument from design to this somewhat
modest conclusion is further strengthened by the background evidence
for the existence of the first cause referred to in the cosmological
argument.
Objections considered. Analogical arguments can be perfectly good
arguments; we use them all the time, many times a day. My choice of
each word on tllis page as I write involves comparing contexts and
situations in the past with my present needs, and this involves the making
of analogies. Some of these choices will be better than others. Some will
be just right, but some will be inappropriate, based on bad or insufficient
evidence. This suggests the two fundamental ways that analogies may be
weakened or discredited as inductive inferences. They may rest either on
biased, selective or partial evidence, or else on inconclusive or insufficient
data. The objections addressed below fit these two categories.
Some objections to the design argument stem from the presence of
evil in the world alongside features of "design." This is not the place for
a full-scale response to the notorious "problem of evil." Notice, however,
that the presence of evil in the universe is irrelevant to the specific
conclusion drawn in the above use of the design argument. The argument says nothing about the goodness of God; it only infers an intelligent
source of design in the universe. Even if there were only one thing in the
universe that manifested a high degree of complexity, and everything else
was chaotic, meaningless, even evil, then there would still be enough
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evidence to support our conclusion that there is an intelligent designer.
Another frequent objection is that no ~atter how great the complexity of the structure may be, a finite number of microchanges may be all
that is needed to yield that complexity; thus a completely random process
ofevolution remains an option. Richard Swinburne, however, has argued
cogently tllat a series of small evolutionary changes only describes how
the simple became complex; it does not explain it. In fact, he argues,
evolution only intensifies the need for God. For it would take even more
intelligence to produce a universe that develops in intricate patterns into
functional complexity than it would simply to create a complex universe
outright. An evolved universe would require the design of both means
and ends, and not of ends alone. 23
A common current objection appeals to the multiple-worlds hypothesis. John Leslie, for example, acknowledges the evidence for fine-tuning,
but then argues that developments in quantum theory imply the existence of innumerable distinct universes of immense size within the larger
universe. There are, as it were, enough "experiments" at universe
production to have simultaneously produced any universe, even this very
complex, finely tuned one, so that this is just one among many universes. 24
Hugh Ross has done an excellent job of showing that the multipleworlds hypothesis, in its various current forms, is not supported by
physics.25 Still, since the existence of many worlds is a logical possibility,
the objection deserves a fuller response.
The hypothesis is really just a fancy form of the old given-enoughtime-anything-can-happen argument. Leslie, for example, actually resorts to the analogy of a typing monkey that will eventually produce a
transcript of a bit of Shakespearean literature if there is no limit to the
opportunities to do so. But if the improbability of an event is so high
that it cannot reasonably be expected to occur apart from outside input
by an intelligent agent, then we should infer the existence of an outside
intelligence to explain the occurrence of that event, regardless of how
much time is available. If the monkey at the typewriter is not an agent
with some intelligence, then there is notlling about an indefinite length
of time at the typewriter that ensures that eventually the monkey would
produce a Shakepearean sonnet. This is true even if it is possible that such
monkeying around would reproduce one of Shakespeare's 154 sonnets.
Furthermore, it is doubtful that the monkey would recognize the
excellence ofits own artifact. So there is the added difficulty of account-
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ing for the existence of intelligences within this world of physical
complexity, not merely the physical complexity itself.
Leslie's argument commits a form of the "gambler's fallacy." The
gambler acts as if the odds of getting double sixes get better with each
role of two dice. But, of course, the odds are one in thirty-six every time
the gambler rolls the dice, regardless of how often they are thrown or
what has come up during previous throws, or, analogous to the state of
affairs described by Leslie, how many pairs are thrown at the same time.
We are left, then, with the plausible conclusion that there is an intelligent
source of design in the universe, an agent with the ability to direct means
to an end. This is the second requirement in providing a basis for miracles
as set out at the beginning of tIlls chapter.
The Moral Argument
Of all of the arguments for God's existence, this one has received the
least attention in the twentieth century, due primarily to the first premise.
The argument begins by observing that there are objective moral absolutes, an idea that has been thoroughly controverted in contemporary
philosophy. Nevertheless, C. S. Lewis's moral argumenf6 offers a unique
analysis of moral behavior from an empirical, observational standpoint
that is, I am convinced, essentially correct. The version outlined here
draws heavily on it.·
Premise 1: Morality is an objective feature ofour universe. Certainly,
this point is difficult to prove. Lewis's argument is based on the
character of human moral language. It is simply impossible, he
reasons, for the larger context of social discourse to occur without
making statements about what is right or wrong or without assuming
that they are true or false. I agree with J. L. Mackie, an atheist, that
our basis for this premise is observationa1. 27 Hence, it is logically
possible that we are misled about all this even though it seems
undeniably true. What I mean is that we simply must affirm objective
moral values in order to make sense of our lives. That Adolf Hitler
and Joseph Stalin were not really morally wrong, that we cannot judge
a society to be truly guilty if it practices genocide or if it causes
needless environmental damage are such repugnant proposals that we
find it impossible to believe that they could be true.
Are the moral judgments we make every day about ourselves and
about others emotive outbursts or conditioned patterns of behavior?28
While we often hear this judgment expressed, it is doubtful that reason-
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able people really believe it. That the brutal slaughter of children is
revolting, horrifYing and antisocial but not immoral or wrong is nonsense. To assert that those who pass judgment on the slaughter of the
innocent are just being intolerant is ridiculous. The claim is even
self-defeating, for tolerance is itself assumed to be an objective, unexceptionable moral value.
Premise 2: Naturalistic «explanations» ofthe objectivity of morality are
inadequate. This point is not especially controver,sial. Most naturalists
concede it. Since any form of naturalistic evolution denies human
freedom, it must deny responsibility, and hence it cannot be that my
actions have any value. 29 For B. F. Skinner, all that remains is a "technology of behavior. " Our values are arbitrary judgments. They are decisions
that we make. Only persons who have the freedom to select views and
actions can have the requisite insight to make moral choice possible and
to actually decide on moral values or actions for themselves.
Social explanations of moral objectivity do not account for moral
value. While it is often asserted that values derive from our society,
culture, religion, parents, school and friends, at least two arguments
show this to be wrong. First, we often think it plausible to make
evaluative moral judgments about our own peers, as well as other
societies. We could not, for example, evaluate Hitler's Germany if this
were not so. Second, the fact that as free persons we are all equal makes
it impossible for anyone finite person to determine value for any other
person. No other human person has the moral authority to make
decisions about right or wrong for me. 30 This, however, leads to a
dilemma. Only persons can be the source of values, yet no finite and
socially conditioned person is in a position to determine authoritatively
the values appropriate for other persons. So, if there really are objective
values, there must be some "ultimate" person who has the moral
authority to set the standards of right and wrong. We are thus driven to
the following conclusion.
Conclusion: There must be a universal personal authority that is the
source of morality. What is crucial about this argument is its implication
that the source of this feature of the universe is a personality, at least in
the sense required by the capacity to understand value and make free
moral judgments. There is, of course, more to the concept of "person,"
but this is enough to show that there is a transcendent agent capable of
moral concerns, decisions and actions that is the third component in
providing a basis for miracles as indicated above.
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Objections Considered
I have dealt with standard objections to the moral argument in the
process of spelling it out. We can summarize them by saying that the
current naturalistic orientation to philosophy, and our culture in general,
makes it difficult to deal adequately with any of the principal concepts:
value, person, freedom, choice, even right and wrong. All are alien to a
naturalistic worldview. In the end, however, this says more about the
poverty of this worldview than it does about the soundness of the moral
argument. It is highly unlikely that our experience that lies behind these
concepts is empty. Thus the moral argument seems quite secure.
Conclusion
We are, then, entitled to assurance that God exists and in particular that
there is a God who can act intelligently and with moral concern within
human history. The design argument and the moral argument each adds
to our understanding of the nature of God, as given in the cosmological
argument. If God is the cause of all contingent existence, then God is
the cause of all properties of contingent objects as well. Thus we have a
cumulative case for God's existence and a methodology for filling out
our understanding of God's nature. 3l
Of course, the argument developed here does not give us a complete
concept of God. But if God is infinite, then no argument or combination
of arguments could give us a full concept. As William Alston observes,
"It is the common teaching of all the higher religions that God is of a
radically different order of being from finite substances and, therefore,
that we cannot expect to at1;ain the grasp of His nature and His doings
that we have of worldly objects.,,32 Nevertheless, we do have a concept
of God sufficiently rich to meet the three requirements established at the
beginning of this chapter.
The piece that is still missing, however, is knowing that God has in
fact entered space/time and thus has acted in human history. How this
is to be understood, as well as how such miracles have occurred, is
discussed in ensuing chapters.
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ONE OF THE CENTRAL CLAIMS OF CHRISTIAN THOUGHT IS THAT GOD

acts in history. At least some of the events that occur in history-particularly (but not exclusively) miraculous events-occur because God brings
them about. God, then, is an agent in human history and in human lives.
God is a God who acts. Thus the God of Christianity is not the God of
deism. Deism was a loosely defined philosophical and religious movement that thrived in Europe in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries
and in America in the eighteenth. For the deists, religion was limited to
a few rationally demonstrable truths about God, the creation and.
morality. These truths included the existence of God, who created the
universe, along with its immutable natural laws. But one crucial point
where the deists differed from traditional Christian thought is that they
rejected all robust notions of divine agency in the world. Indeed, they
denied as superstitious all claims of direct interaction between God and
the created world. Miracles, revelations, epiphanies and incarnations
were all ruled out. Later deists suggested that God is like someone who
winds a clock and then lets it run on its own without interference.
Here are three traditional Christian propositions about God:
1. God is immaterial.

